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HINES V. ANCHOR MOTOR FREIGHT: 
ANOTHER STEP IN THE SEEMINGLY 

INEXORABLE MARCH TOWARD CONVERTING 

FEDERAL JUDGES (AND JURIES) INTO 

LABOR ARBITRATORS OF LAST RESORT 

by Peter Adomeit* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This article, directed to the courts, and especially to the federal 
bench, carries this message: you are in danger of converting the fed­
eral judiciary into a panel of labor arbitrators. 
The advance sheets of the federal courts are beginning to read 
like Labor Arbitration Reports. The kinds of disputes that in the past 
were resolved by private arbitration are beginning to appear at an 
increasing rate on the dockets of the federal courts: Did the company 
have just cause when it discharged the grievants for allegedly falsify­
ing their expense accounts?1 Did the company violate the agreement 
with the union when it assigned the grievants to night work?2 Was 
the employer justified in discharging the grievant for allegedly strik­
ing her superior?3 Did the grievant place the meat on the loading 
dock, intending it to be picked up by accomplices, and did that con­
stitute grounds for discharge?4 Was the company justified in discharg­
ing the grievant for possessing a bandsaw stolen from the company?S 
Was the grievant, who signed a confession admitting his theft, dis­
charged for cause?6 Should the company have given credit to the 
* B.A., Carleton College; J.D. University of Minnesota; Associate Professor of Law. 
University of Connecticut School of Law: 
1. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.• 424 U.S. 554 (1976). 
2. Barrett v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 538 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1976). 
3. Wilson v. Washington Post Co., [1976) 93 L.R.R.M. 2300 (D.D.C. Jul)· 21. 1976). 
4. Sarnelli v. Meat Cutters & Butchers Local 33, 333 F. Supp. 228 (D. Mass. 1971). 
aird 457 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1972). 
5. Lewis v. Magna Am. Corp., 472 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1972). 
6. Whitmore v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, (Div. of Greyhound Lines. Inc.). 383 F. 
Supp. 46 (E.D. Mich. 1973). 
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grievant for seniority earned while working in South America?7 Was 
the grievant, a truck driver who admittedly sought pay for time not 
worked, guilty of theft of company time, and thus properly dis­
charged?8 Was the grievant discharged for cause after he struck a 
bridge with his truck?9 Was the grievant's alleged intoxication suffi­
cient cause for his discharge?lO Did past practice justify paying the 
grievant a lower rate of pay for piloting a smaller boat?l1 Is al­
coholism an illness, entitling the grievant to sick leave under the 
contract?12 \Vas the grievant, who had only one good eye, properly 
laid off when his job was changed to require him to drive?13 Was the 
grievant's job classification proper?14 Did the company assign the cor­
rect seniority date to the grievant?15 Was the grievant's explanation of 
why he allowed an unauthorized female passenger on a charter bus 
believable, or was he discharged for cause?16 Should the grievant, 
who while off duty and away from the factory assaulted his foreman, 
be reinstated with back pay, or was discharge an appropriate penalty?17 
These cases, taken from the reports of the federal courts, involve 
issues no different from those in the hundreds of reported cases in 
the CCH Labor Arbitration Awards or in the BNA Labor Arbitration 
Reports, not to mention the thousands of arbitration decisions that go 
unreported. If the courts would prefer to handle more of these 
cases-and there are more where these came from, namely from the 
daily frictions of the working place-all they need do is give a broad 
reading to Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight. 18 
7. Turner v. Air Transp. Dispatchers' Ass'n., 468 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1972). 
8. Hardee v. North Carolina Allstate Servs., Inc., 537 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1976) (rt,· 
versing a jury verdict for plaintiff of $20,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 In 
punitive damages). 
9. Whitten v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 521 F.2d 1335 (6th Cir. 1975). 
10. Zaleski V. Glendale Foods, Inc., and Meat Cutters & Butchers Local 26, [1975] 
91 L.R.R.M. 2377 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 18, 1975). 
11. Dishman V. Crain Bros., Inc., 415 F. Supp. 277 (W.D. Pa. 1976). 
12. Hilliard v. Armco Steel Corp., 421 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Pa. 1976), aIrel without 
opinion, 532 F.2d 746 (3rd Cir. 1976). 
13. Siskey v. Teamsters Local 261, 419 F. Supp. 48 (\V.D. Pa. 1976). 
14. GroInick v. United Furniture Workers, Local 75A·75B, [1976J 91 L.R.R.M. 2558 
(D. Md. Feb. 5, 1976). 
15. Butler v. Local 823, In!,I Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1975). 
16. Miller v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., [1977J 95 L.R.R.M. 2871 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 
1977). 
17. Griffin V. UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972). (This case resulted in II jury verdict 
for the grievant of SI2,000.) 
18. 424 U.S. 554 (1976). 
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II. HINES V. ASCHOR MOTOR FREIGlIT 
Hines19 involved the nine year saga of eight truck drivers who 
were caught up in an alleged scheme to defraud their employer, An­
chor Motor Freight. Anchor accused the drivers of falsif)'ing their 
motel expense accounts and began dismissal proceedings. When the 
union took the case to the final grievance hearing, the only evidence 
it presented to the arbitrators was the drivers' protests of innocence. 
The company had the drivers' expense sheets and motel receipts, and 
affidavits from the motel clerk and the motel owner, both swearing 
that the receipts were accurate. The case was tried before a joint 
arbitration committee of six: three from the trucking industry and 
three from labor. The committee members were not persuaded by 
the drivers' claims of innocence. They upheld the discharges, the 
labor members voting with management. Although this proceeding 
was not before a neutral arbitrator,20 by agreement the decision was 
final and binding and therefore enforceable.21 
Having lost their case before the joint committee, the drivers 
retained an attorney. The attorney interviewed the motel owner ,md 
secured a written admission that he presumed the receipts were accu­
rate, but had no direct personal knowledge of that fact. Armed with 
this new development, the attorney petitioned the joint arbitmtion 
committee to reopen the case. The committee, responding that the 
decision was not based on the affidavit of the owner, refused, where­
upon the eight drivers sued the company and the union for one mil­
lion dollars. Their claim against the company was the same as their 
case before the industry panel: they had falsified nothing and there­
fore the company had violated the agreement in the labor contract 
19. The facts of the case as set forth in the complaint ,Uld affidavits ~ubmittl'd on tlll' 
motion for summary judgment appear in the opinions of tll(.' district court. the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court. See Hines v. Local 377, lnt'l Bhd. of 
Teamsters, [1973] 72 Lab. Cas. ,: 13,987 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 1973); Hine' \". Lot'aI377, 
Int'I Bhd, of Teamsters, 506 F.2d 1153 (6th Cir. 19741; Hines v. Anchor ~totor Frt'lght, 
Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976). 
20. Robert Coulson, president of the AmeriC<1Jl Arbitmtion ru~oCI.l.tion, .ugUl'~ th.lt 
the decision of the joint committee was more like a settlement of a ~l,\·.IIlC"l' th.1Il .111 
arbitration decision. He rightly perceives that Hines undl'rmines tll(.' doctrinl' of finality 
of arbitration decisions, if the decision of the joint panel is trl'ated ,u. a dl'l'l~ion of .1.11 
arbitrator. See Coulson, Vaca v. Sipes' Illegitimate Child: Thl' 11II11act of ..\ndlOr .\tutor 
Freight on the Finality Doctrine in Griet'ance Arbitratioll, 10 CA. L. REv. 693, 697-99 
(1976). Cf Jacobs, Fair Representation and Binding ,\rbilratioll, 28 L-\u. L.J. 369 j 1977,. 
21. See Ceneral Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local 89 v. Rbs & Co., 372 l'S. 
517 (1963) (decision of trucking industry joint arbitration committee Iwld l'nforce<lbll.'). 
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not to discharge except for cause. Their claim against the union was 
this: by failing to investigate the clerk, by telling the drivers not to 
worry, by failing to give the hearing panel any paper evidence to 
counter the company's paper, and by acting out of animosity, the 
union had violated its duty of fair representation. 22 
During the pretrial stages, the drivers' attorney deposed the 
clerk, and the case took on a new twist. According to the clerk, what 
at first appeared to be a ploy by the drivers to cheat Anchor Motor 
Freight turned out to be something quite different. The most damn­
ing evidence against the drivers-the motel receipts-had shown 
quite clearly that they paid less for their lodgings than they claimed 
on their expense accounts. In the deposition taken three years after the 
discharge hearing, the motel clerk, who had sworn in the affidavit 
presented at the hearing that the receipts were accurate, decided to 
recant his story. He claimed in the deposition that the receipts were 
not accurate. In effect, he admitted that he was stealing from the 
motel. 
The three courts that reviewed Hines all indicated that the com­
pany acted in good faith, without knowing that the clerk would 
recant. The union appears to have known nothing more about the 
matter than the company. Only the drivers and the clerk know for 
certain what really happened. The drivers' sworn denials were not 
believed by the company or the joint arbitration committee. The 
clerk made two conflicting statements under oath, but as of yet, no 
trier of fact has considered his testimony in the light of his recanta­
tion. Historically, the courts have reacted to recantations with .sus­
picion.23 The decision of the United States Supreme Court, however, 
did not reflect that suspicion.24 But even if the recantation were 
true,25 the drivers would still need to prove that the union had vio­
lated its duty of fair representation. 
The drivers' allegations that the union acted out of spite and ill 
will and thus violated the duty of fair representation were crucial to 
22. The plaintiffs rested their case upon Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 111 (1967). 
23. See United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1954). See also 58 AM. JUII. 2d 
New Trial § 175 (1971). 
24. "There were later indications that the motel clerk was in fact the culprit." 424 
U.S. at 558. 
25. The July 1977 issue of Study Time, distributed by the American Arbitration As­
sociation to labor arbitrators, describes a discharge case involving a hospital orderly. He 
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the success of their attempt to have the case reopened. The courts 
have set aside arbitration decisions only on the narrowest of 
grounds,26 and this case does not fit any of them. The arbitrators did 
not exceed their powers; they did not refuse to hear relevant tes­
timony; they did not fail to grant a reasonable request for a con­
tinuance; their decision was not obtained by fraud or corruption; and 
their decision did not require the company to perform an illegal act. 
Courts have stated, in dicta, that an award based on evidence J.."Jlown 
by a prevailing party to have been false at the time it was used may 
be set aside.27 However, this principle would not govern the Hines 
case since there was no showing that Anchor Motor Freight manufac­
tured, or knowingly relied on, false evidence.28 The compan)' acted 
in good faith. 
The drivers could have tried to have the arbitration reopened on 
the ground of newly discovered evidence, namely, the clerk's deposi­
was accused by a nurse of "amusing himself by pushing an elderly patient in a wheel· 
chair at high speed." At the arbitration hearing, she changed her story. The arbitrator 
disbelieved her recantation, and credited her first story. 
Occasionally, a witness who recants will recant the recantation. Till.' Hartford 
Courant, Apr. 29, 1977, at 20, reported that "a 21 year-old Hartford man admitted 
Thursday that he retracted his statement to police implicating a woman friend in plan­
ning the robbery of a North End landlord, who was killed during the holdup. But [the 
man] said he gave the retraction to [her] defense attorney in his Hartford jail cell last 
December only because his family was threatened by the brother of the woman he 
accused." 
26. See, e.g., N.Y. Arbitration Act, N.Y. ClV. PMC. LAw § 7511 (~lcKinney 1963); 
U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1970). Connecticut's law is typical. Coss. CEo";. 
STAT. § 52-418 (1977) sets forth the traditional grounds for vacating awards: 
(a) If the award has been procured by corruption, fmud or undue means; (b) if 
there has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrators or 
either of them: (c) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refUSing 
to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear e\i­
dence pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action b)' which 
the rights of any party have been prejudiced: (d) if the arbitrators have ex­
ceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and 
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. 
Nor mayan arbitration decision be set aside simply because the court disagrees with 
the arbitrator's interpretation of a contract. The New York Court of Appeals has st.'lted: 
"Those who have chosen arbitration as their forum should recognize that arbitration 
procedures and awards often differ from what may be expected in courts of law." 
Rochester School Dist. v. Teachers' Ass'n, [1977] 95 L.R.R.~1. 2119, 2121 (Apr. 1, 1971). 
27. See Karppinen v. Karl Kiefer Mach. Co., 187 F.2d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1951) (dictum); 
Newark Stereotypers Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 391 F.2d 594 (3rd 
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 954 (1968) (dictum). 
28. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. at 569. 
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tion, but that too would have been an uphill battle. Neither the stat­
utes nor the court cases allow new arbitration hearings for newly dis­
covered evidence,29 because to do so would destroy one of the major 
advantages of arbitration: finality.30 Even if the law were otherwise 
and arbitration decisions could be reopened for newly discovered 
evidence, the drivers still would have had to argue that the evidence 
could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence. When the 
losing side tries to reopen a court judgment, the law requires no 
less.31 
But if the evidence could not have been discovered with reason­
able diligence, how can it be alleged that the union violated its duty 
of fair representation by failing to discover the evidence in advance of 
trial? The two theories conflict. As it turned out, the Hines decision 
states that arbitration decisions cannot be reopened for newly discov­
ered evidence.32 
The drivers could have tried to have the case reopened on the 
ground that the arbitration panel relied upon hearsay evidence, 
namely, the motel receipts and the affidavits of the clerk and owner. 
This too probably would have failed. The receipts of the motel were 
prepared in the ordinary course of business and would have been 
admissible in court under the business records exception to the hear­
say rule. 33 The affidavits would not have been admissible in court, 
29. "Petitioners are not entitled to relitigate their discharge merely because they 
offer newly discovered evidence that the charges against them were false and that In 
fact they were fired without cause." Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. at 
571. 
30. See Newspaper Guild Local 35 v. Washington Post Co., 442 F.2d 1234 (D.C. Clr. 
1971). "To give appellant a rematch before the arbitrator, merely because a witness who 
refused to enter the original contest has now decided to participate ... would undercut 
the finality and therefore the entire usefulness of arbitration as an expeditious and gen­
erally fair method of settling disputes." 442 F.2d at 1238. 
31. See, e.g., Orso v. City and County of Honolulu, 56 Haw. 241, 534 P.2d 489 
(1975); see also 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 60.23[4], at 273 (2d ed. 1975). 
One seeking a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence must 
show not only that the evidence upon which he relies as the basis of his claim 
was in fact newly discovered or unknown to him until after the trial had bcen 
had, but also that he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and 
produced such evidence at the trial-that his failure to produce the alleged 
newly discovered evidence at the original trial was not due to laches, negli­
gence, or want of diligence on his part. 
58 AM. JUR. 2d New Trial § 168 (1971). 
32. 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976). 
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970); FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (which states a qualification 
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but arbitrators are not bound by the rules of evidence and may rely 
upon technically inadmissible hearsay.34 One of arbitration's advan­
tages is that it does not follow every technical rule of evidence. 
Therefore, although hearsay was presented, its use provides no 
ground for overturning an arbitration award. 35 
The drivers could have attacked the rule of law allowing deci­
sions of joint labor-industry panels to stand as arbitration awards. But 
that would have meant attempting to have a decision of the United 
States Supreme Court overruled.36 
Thus, the drivers picked the only argument that stood a chance 
of succeeding: that the union violated its duty of fair representation. 
This theory was not without its difficulties. The Supreme Court had 
never held that a union violated the duty of fair representation in the 
way it presented a grievance in arbitration. The nearest case, \Taca v. 
Sipes,37 involved a union that refused to arbitrate. Compromising be­
tween giving the union absolute power to refuse arbitration and giv­
ing the worker absolute power to force arbitration, Vaca v. Sipes 
allowed the worker to sue the company for breach of contract if the 
on the admissibility of records in cases where "the source of information or other cir­
cumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness."). 
34. See, e.g., Petroleum Separating Co. v. lntemmerican Ref. Corp., 296 F.2d 124 (2d 
Cir. 1961) ("[T]he arbitrators appear to have accepted hearsay evidence from both par­
ties, as they were entitled to do. If parties wish to rely on such technical objections they 
should not include arbitration clauses in their contracts. The appeal is quite insubstan­
tial.") (footnote omitted); Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. Y. C.S.T., Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d 228, 241 
(1946) ("[A]rbitrators are not bound by strict adherence to legal procedure and to the 
rules on the admission of evidence expected in judicial trials. Such a requirement 
would tend to defeat the object of the arbitration proceeding.") (citations omitted); Bur­
chell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 96 (1853); American Almond Prods. Co. Y. Consoli­
dated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir. 1944) (L. Hand) ("Arbitration mar or 
may not be a desirable substitute for trials in courts; as to that the parties must decide 
in each instance. But when they have adopted it. the}' must be content with its infor­
malities; they may not hedge it about with those procedural limitations which it is pre­
cisely its purpose to avoid. They must content themselves with looser approximations to 
the enforcement of their rights than those that the law accords them, when the}' resort 
to its machinery."). 
35. Under rule 29 of the American Arbitration Association Labor Arbitration Rules, 
the arbitrator may rely upon affidavits but is not required to do so. Some arbitrators are 
reluctant to decide cases based on hearsay alone. But the matter is left to the discretion 
of the arbitrator. See F. ELKOURl & E. ELKOURl. How ARBITRATIOS WORKS 280.81 
(3d ed. 1973). 
36. General Drivers, Warehousemen, & Helpers Local 89 \'. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 
517 (1963). For a criticism of these committees, see R. JAMES & E. JAMES, HOFFA .\.'1:0 
THE TEAMSTERS 171-85 (1965). 
37. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
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union refused to arbitrate out of spite or ill will, or arbitrarily, or in 
bad faith. Some lower courts had extended Vaca to include cases in 
which unions arbitrated and lost, on the theory that if the union un­
dermined the integrity of the arbitration process by deliberately los­
ing the case by not putting up much of a fight, the individual ought 
to have another chance to win. 38 But in none of these cases did the 
main witness against the grievants recant his testimony one year after 
the hearing. 
Because the duty of fair representation could mean that a union 
has a duty to investigate a grievance,39 and because the union in 
Hines did not interview the clerk or the motel owner, it arguably 
failed to investigate the case adequately. Had the only allegation 
been failure to investigate, the drivers would probably have lost. 
Failure to investigate may constitute malpractice. There are a few re­
ported cases against unions alleging straight malpractice in the han­
dling of grievances. Some cases have been successful in which the 
union has let slip a deadline. 4o Others have not been successful be­
cause the courts have found no ill will or bad faith.41 Imposing mal­
38. The clearest expression of this doctrine came down after the Hines lawsuit was 
filed. In Margetta v. Pam Pam Corp., 501 F.2d 179, 180 (9th Cir. 1974), the court stated: 
To us, it makes little difference whether the union subverts the arbitration pro­
cess by refusing to proceed as in Vaca or follows the arbitration trnil to the end, 
but in so doing subverts the arbitration process by failing to represent the em­
ployee. In neither case, does the employee receive fair representation. 
Margetta and other cases are cited in Hines, 424 U.S. at 571-72 n.ll. 
39. Before Hines, several Courts of Appeals had so stated. See Turner v. Air Trunsp. 
Dispatchers' Ass'n, 468 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1972) ("It is beyond doubt that the duty 
of fair representation includes an obligation to investigate and to ascertain the merit of 
employee grievances."). Turner found this duty in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191, 
wherein it was stated: "[W]e accept the proposition that a union may not arbitrarily 
ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion ...." See also De 
Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Packing, 425 F.2d 281, 284 (1st Cir. 1970) ("There 
was no evidence as to any plaintiff except [one] that the union ever investigated or 
made any judgment concerning the merits of her grievance.") (footnote omitted); Minnis 
v. UAW, 531 F.2d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 1975) ("Minnis presented testimony which, if be­
lieved, showed an utter failure by the unions to make even a minimal attempt to inves­
tigate or process his grievance."). 
40. See Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975); Handwerk v. 
Steelworkers, 67 Mich. App. 747,242 N.W.2d 514 (1976); Ruggirello v. Ford Motor Co., 
411 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Mich. 1976). 
41. In Balowski v. UAW, 372 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1967) the grievant argued that the 
Union erred in submitting to an arbitrator in 1962 the question of the grievant's health 
as of 1958. The court found no evidence of bad faith and ordered the complaint dis­
missed. Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1970) stated at 872 that 
"proof that the union may have acted negligently or exercised poor judgment is not 
enough to support a claim of unfair representation." The district court stated that the 
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practice liability upon a union for the manner in which it handles 
grievances involves momentous questions of public policy. Might not 
such a policy require an unrealistic level of expertise? Should union 
stewards and business agents be held to the same standards as attor­
neys? Should the remedy for poor representation be political, that is, 
the election of better union leaders? Might not the cost of malprac­
tice liability, or malpractice insurance (if it could be found), bankrupt 
weak or small unions? Is it fair to impose liability on the employer 
because it won a case in which the union erred? Should the decision 
to impose malpractice liability be made by Congress, after public 
hearings, rather than by the courts? 
However, because it was alleged in Hines that the union failed to 
investigate out of spite or ill will, the case appeared to fit the theory 
that a union has a duty to represent its members fairly.42 One of the 
drivers had been fired before and this fact was alleged to be sufficient 
to indicate that the union had ill will towards him. In addition, some 
of the drivers had, in a direct challenge to the union leadership, led a 
wildcat strike. If a union contract contains a no-strike clause, a failure 
by the leadership to try to end a wildcat strike makes the union liable 
for strike-caused damages.43 Thus the strike was alleged to proVide 
further evidence of ill will. The third piece of evidence presented on 
the issue of bad faith involved an earlier union merger. Some of the 
charges against the Union included failure to "adequatel), and full), prepare a paper 
defense for the plaintiff at the railroad hearing" and failure to become "fully acquainted 
with all the relevant facts of the plaintiff's case." 305 F. Supp. 443, 444 (E.O. Pa. 1969). 
For a discussiQn favoring malpractice liability, see Note, 34 WASH. & LEE L.R. 309 (1977). 
42. When Hines reached the court of appeals, the court stated that, in order to sur­
vive a motion for summary judgment in a breach of duty action, the plaintiff must allege 
perfunctory treatment by the union (here, that the union failed adequate!)' to investigate 
the grievance), and that the union acted in bad faith. Hines v. Local 377, Int'l Bhd. of 
Teamsters, 506 F.2d at 1155 (1974). "The failure to investigate, by itself, is insufficient 
to fix liability on the union since 'proof that the union may have acted negligentl)' or 
exercised poor judgment is not enough to support a claim of unfair representation:" 
506 F.2d at 1156 (citation omitted). The court of appeals, quoting Balowski \'. UAW, 372 
F.2d 829, 833 (6th Cir. 1967) indicated that a "gross mistake or inaction" would be an 
indication of bad faith. 506 F.2d at 1157. The grant of certiorari did not include this 
portion of the case. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 561 (1976). 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Michigan has held that a union ma)' \'iolate 
the duty of fair representation even though it has not acted in bad faith. SC(' Lowe v. 
Hotel Employees Local 705, 389 Mich. 123, 148, 205 N.W.2d 167, 178 (1973). Some 
United States courts of appeals have agreed. See gellerally, Clark, Till.' Dllty of Fair 
Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TE...... L. RE\'. 1119 (1973). 
43. See, e.g., Eazor E:l.llress, Inc. v. Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975), Cert. 
denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976), in which the union's failure to control a wildcat strike 
resulted in a judgment against the union in excess of one million dollars. 
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drivers were members of a local that had merged with the union. The 
merger, which was not entirely smooth, resulted in some animosity 
between the two groups. 
The union and Anchor moved for summary judgment. The trial 
court granted both motions, stating that although the union might 
have been careless or might have exercised bad judgment, it did not 
violate the duty of fair representation. 44 The court of appeals ruled 
that whether or not the union acted out of animosity was a question 
of fact, and that on the facts presented, a jury could find that the 
union could have discovered the clerk's lie in advance of the arbi­
tration.45 The case against the union was remanded for trial. The 
court of appeals, however, agreed with the trial court that Anchor 
should be dropped as a defendant, because Anchor was not shown to 
have acted in bad faith. 46 Both courts indicated by their rulings that 
it would be unfair to impose a million dollar judgment on the com­
pany for relying upon the affidavits, the receipts, and the arbitration 
award. The drivers asked for a writ of certiorari;47 the union did not 
seek review. The drivers' request was granted.48 
The Supreme Court held that, assuming the union breached its 
duty of fair representation by failing to investigate, and assuming the 
drivers were innocent of the charges, then the company is liable for 
discharging them without cause, even though the company acted in 
good faith. 49 Read narrowly, Hines simply reaffirms the rule in Vac(l 
that a company may be sued for breach of contract, notwithstanding 
the arbitration clause, if the union has violated its duty of fair rep­
resentation. The major difference between the two cases is, of course, 
the existence of the arbitration award in Hines. In Vaca, the union 
refused to arbitrate; in Hines, they arbitrated and lost. 
Technically, the Supreme Court in Hines did not hold that a 
44. Hines v. Local 377, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, [1973] 72 Lab. Cas. ~ 13,987 (N.D. 
Ohio Sept. 25, 1973). 
45. 506 F.2d at 1157. 
46. Id. at 1157-58. 
47. 424 U.S. at 561 n.7. 
48. 421 U.S. 928 (1975). The question on which certiorari was granted reads as 
follows: 
Whether petitioners' claim under LMRA § 301 for wrongful discharge is barred 
by the decision of a joint grievance committee upholding their discharge, not­
withstanding that their union breached its duty of fair representation in pro­
cessing their grievance so as to deprive them and the grievance committee of 
overwhelming evidence of their innocence of the alleged dishonesty for which 
they were discharged. 
49. 424 U.S. at 561, 570-72. 
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union violates the duty of fair representation by failing to investigate 
a grievance out of spite or ill will. That issue, decided by the court of 
appeals against the union, was not reviewed. 50 But the majority opin­
ion in Hines rests upon the presumption that the union violated its 
duty of fair representation. One can only conclude that the Supreme 
Court approved, tacitly, the holding of the court of appeals that a 
jury could infer from the drivers' evidence a violation of the duty of 
fair representation. The discussion that follows indicates why this de­
cision is wrong. 
III. AN EMERGING DOUBLE STANDARD? 
While the decision below simply reversed a summary judgment, 
the court of appeals would allow a jury to infer that animosity caused 
the failure to investigate. Such failure appears to the author to be 
equally consistent \vith good trial strategy. While the drivers alleged 
that the union, out of bad faith, failed to produce paper evidence to 
counter the company's paper evidence, 51 and failed to discover through 
investigation that the clerk was the culprit, 52 the resulting reversal of 
summary judgment imposes a standard of preparation upon unions 
that is at once unreasonable and unworkable. 53 
First of all, the union knew, in advance of the final hearing, that 
the clerk had signed the affidavit and had sworn to the accuracy of 
the receipts. 54 A further interview \vith the clerk could have been 
unproductive and risky-unproductive because many witnesses, once 
interviewed, identify \vith the side that spoke to them frrst;55 and 
risky because the clerk could testify at the hearing that the union 
50. Id. at 561, n.7. The court of appeals would require proof of ill will plus imlde­
quate investigation. 506 F.2d at 1156-57. 
51. Hines v. Local 377, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, (1973) 72 Lab. Cas. at C; 28,131. 
("defendant Union presented not a single piece of paper in response to the charges 
against the plaintiffs at the grievance hearings"). 
52. Hines v. Teamsters, 506 F.2d at 1156. 
53. However, the court added that "the failure to investigate, by itself, is insufficient 
to fix liability on the union...." 506 F.2d at 1156. But if the plaintiffs could coO\'ince a 
jury that there was ill will between them and the union, the failure to in\'estigate would 
violate the duty of fair representation. 
54. The decision of the trial court reveals that the affidavits and receipts were used 
against the grievants as the case was processed through the grievance procedure. (1973) 
72 Lab. Cas. at ~ 28,130. 
55. A. MORRILL, TRIAL DIPLOMACY 172 (2d ed. 1973) ("[W)jtnesses have a ten­
dency to remain loyal to the first person who interviewed them and the)' may regard the 
second investigator as a person from 'the other side.' "). 
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tried to pressure him into changing his story. We know from hind­
sight that the clerk never testified, and, in fact, recanted his story. 
But to require the union to interview the clerk, who had already 
given a signed statement, prior to the hearing, is to substitute the 
judgment of the court for the judgment of the union on a matter of 
trial tactics and strategy. 
Similarly, the union could have interviewed the clerk's em­
ployer. He claimed in the affidavit used in the grievance process that 
the receipts were accurate. Weighing the risk that he would change 
his story against the risk that he would claim the union had pressured 
him, the union could have reasonably concluded that the safer course 
would be to wait until the hearing and cross-examine the witnesses at 
that time. 
There was no cross examination-neither the clerk nor the 
owner testified. We do not know whether they were available. We do 
know that later the owner admitted he did not know of his own 
knowledge whether the receipts were accurate. 56 We also know that 
the panel that heard the grievance said they did not rely upon the 
owner's affidavit. 57 
This case demonstrates the problems of using affidavits in a dis­
charge case. It would have been better if the company had produced 
the witnesses. It might even make some sense to require live tes­
timony in such cases. 58 But to reverse the arbitration because the 
union failed to investigate makes little sense. Whether or not to in­
terview adverse witnesses before trial is a matter of judgment. There 
is no tradition of formal discovery in arbitration cases. Usually, when 
a case goes to arbitration, it has been heard at the lower levels of the 
grievance process, and each side is aware of the other's claims. When 
a labor lawyer or a business agent defends a grievant in a discharge 
arbitration, the advocate usually has a file showing the company's 
case and may even have a transcript of prior testimony, or, as in 
Hines, affidavits from witnesses. But in the usual case, there simply is 
neither time nor money to hire investigators to do character checks of 
the witnesses against the grievant. Such a requirement would be un­
reasonable. A few examples illustrate this point. 
In a recent case tried to the Connecticut Board of Mediation and 
56. 506 F.2d at 1155. 
57. Id. 
58. Some arbitrators would require live testimony in a case like this. See note 35 
supra. 
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Arbitration,59 the company, suspecting that the grievant charged auto 
parts to the company and installed them in his own car, showed an 
employee of the auto parts store photographs of suspects. He iden­
tified the grievant as the man who ordered the parts. The company 
then checked the grievant's personal automobile and determined that 
its new parts corresponded to those charged to the company. The 
grievant was fired. He denied the charges. The union decided not to 
arbitrate. The grievant talked to the man who identified him, and 
following their conversation, the clerk changed his story and retracted 
the identification. The grievant then demanded that the union arbi­
trate the case. The company resisted arbitration, claiming the time 
limits had expired. The grievant claimed the union had violated the 
duty of fair representation, and therefore the time limits did not 
apply. Under the Hines rule, to get to the jUI)' on this issue, the 
grievant would have to show only that the union bore him ill will.GO 
In another case, a bus company suspected that a certain ticket 
clerk was shortchanging travelers, especially those who spoke poor 
English. 61 After warning the clerk, the company hired a detective 
agency, which employed eight Spanish-speaking Americans to pose as 
travelers. Each purchased a ticket from the grievant, giving him 
marked bills. Each immediately delivered the ticket and the change 
to an official of the detective agency. According to their testimony. 
and that of the official, seven out of the eight travelers were short­
changed. The grievant protested his innocence and denied short­
changing anyone. He admitted he could have made a mistake in 
quoting the proper ticket price but claimed that all clerks make mis­
takes from time to time. Did the union have a duty to hire an inves­
tigator to check the character and background of each of the wit­
nesses against the grievant? Hines would suggest that if any of them 
later recant, the answer is yes. Yet the cost of such an investigation 
could be hundreds of dollars, more than some unions can afford. 
In a third case, a bus driver, while coming down a long moun­
tain grade on a two-lane highway, turned a comer and discovered the 
traffic in front of him stopped dead.62 He applied the brakes, but 
59. The source of the case is the Connecticut Board of ~lediation and Arbitration. 
The names of the union and company are protected by the privacy of arbitration. 
60. 506 F.2d at 1153. 
61. This is an actual case in which the author participated. The names of the union 
and company are protected by the privacy of arbitration. 
62. This is an actual case in which the author participated. The names of the union 
and company are protected by the privacy of arbitration. 
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there was not enough room to stop. To avoid slamming into the bus 
directly in front of him, at the last moment he swerved his vehicle to 
the left, and struck a car in the oncoming lane, killing its occupant. 
At the arbitration hearing concerning his discharge, the company 
produced evidence in the form of a written report stating that the 
brakes were tested after the accident and were in excellent working 
order; that the company had a rule requiring drivers to maintain 
one-quarter of a mile between two company vehicles, a rule which 
the grievant violated; and that within the last year, the grievant had 
received a written warning when a company official saw him driving 
down the mountain road, following too closely the vehicle in front of 
him. The grievant denied following too closely and claimed the 
brakes failed. He produced a report of the highway patrol showing 
that the company had received a ticket after the accident for having 
brakes that were illegally adjusted. According to Hines, the union 
would have a duty to investigate whether the company official who 
tested the bus, and the one who saw the grievant following a vehicle 
too closely were telling the truth, presumably by hiring an inves­
tigator to do character checks. 
This imposes upon a union a higher duty than the law imposes 
upon a trial lawyer who prepares a case for trial. There is no question 
that given enough time, and money, a trial lawyer or a union can do 
character checks on witnesses. But to require them to do so would go 
far beyond the way that most labor arbitrations, and most court trials, 
are prepared. Indeed, in hearings before the National Labor Rela­
tions Board, parties cannot discover the testimony against them until 
the hearing. 63 
It is important to consider the economics of trying discharge 
cases. A discharge case may be worth more in attorneys' fees after it 
is lost than before it is tried. Suppose in Hines the union had hired 
an attorney to conduct the hearing. A busy labor attorney might 
spend one-half a day in preparation, and a day in arbitration, and bill 
the client five hundred dollars. Or the attorney may be on retainer 
with the union, and simply try the case as part of the normal fee. It 
63. There is no right to discovery in NLRB proceedings. The Interim Report nnd 
Recommendations of the Chairman's Task Force on the NLRB for 1976, nt 56, revenls n 
deep division of opinion on whether this should continue. The courts nre not nllowlng 
discovery under the Freedom of Information Act. See Au & Son v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80 
(3d Cir. 1976); Goodfriend W. Corp. v. Fuches, 535 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1976); ccrt. 
denied, _ U.S. _; Title Guarantee v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, _ U.S. _. 
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is not the practice for lawyers to try such cases on contingent fees; 
most unions would not agree to such a proposal. 
However, if the grievants lose the arbitration, and if they then 
hire their own lawyer to sue the union for violation of the duty of fair 
representation, they may well have to agree to a contingency fee of 
thirty percent or more. In a case like Hines, involVing eight truck 
drivers, nine years of back pay, and a claim for one million dollars, 
suddenly the case acquires real value. The lawyer now has an incen­
tive to spend days on such a case. We therefore have a system that 
encourages the first lawyer to spend perhaps a day or two to arbitrate 
the case, and the second lawyer to spend many days trying to dis­
cover whether the arbitration was imperfect. 
It is certainly true that union and management advocates make 
mistakes in arbitration. Advocates, like some trial lawyers, occasion­
ally cross-examine witnesses when they should remain silent, remain 
silent when they should cross-examine, fail to see an argument, or fail 
to fully develop the facts. Unprepared witnesses testify in ways that 
surprise everyone. Yet if a company representative makes a mistake, 
and the company loses, the company cannot appeal to a court to 
overturn the award. The company advocate is under no duty of fair 
representation. But if the union advocate performs poorly, and the 
union loses, the grievants can appeal to a court. And if they can con­
vince a jury that the union leaders do not like them, because they are 
troublemakers, or because they were fired before, or beC'cluse they 
once led a wildcat strike, they can win in court, even though they 
lost in arbitration. In other words, malpractice plus ill will equals an 
overturned arbitration decision. 
In fact, the union error need not amount to malpractice. If a trial 
lawyer had done what the union did in Hines, there would have been 
no malpractice.64 Another example is Holodnak v. AceD Corp., 
Avco-Lycoming Div., 65 which involved a man who was fired for 
64. The author could find no case in which a lawyer was held guilty of malpractice 
for failure to interview a witness who had already signed a statement. The failure to 
take a depOSition was claimed to be malpractice in one case, but the question was not 
decided. See Talbot v. Schroeder, 13 Ariz. App. 230, 231, 475 P.2d 520 (1970). An attor­
ney is expected to exercise "that degree of care, skill and diligence which is commonl>· 
possessed and exercised by attorneys in practice in the jurisdiction." Annot., ,\ttOnlcy's 
Liability for Negligence in Preparing or Conducting Litigation, 45 A.L.R.2d 5, 12 
(1956). See also W. PROSSER, TORTS § 32, at 161-62 (3d cd. 1964), The author's experi­
ence in preparing and presenting over two hundred arbitration cases is that an ad\'erse 
witness who has signed a statement is rarely interviewed again. 
65. 381 F. Supp. 191, 193-94 (D. Conn. 1974), which was affirml-d in part and re­
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criticizing his company in a newspaper article. The discharge went to 
arbitration. The union's lawyer, representing Holodnak, £'liled to 
argue that the first amendment applied to Avco. That failure, among 
others, was held to be a violation of the duty of fair representation. 66 
Avco was a private corporation which manufactured many prod­
ucts, both civilian and military. The government owned the land on 
which the factory was located and some of the buildings and equip­
ment. Government officials inspected the quality of the products. The 
trial court67 found that the company and the government were effec­
tively "one"; that Avco could not constitutionally discharge Holodnak 
for writing the newspaper article; and that the union, failing to assert 
the first amendment argument to the arbitrator, violated the duty of 
fair representation. The court of appeals affirmed these findings. 68 
Were this an action against a lawyer for malpractice, the lawyer 
would have won. Numerous courts have ruled that a lawyer is not 
liable for taking a position on a legal question which is uncertain. If 
reasonable 'lawyers may differ over a legal proposition, failing to as­
sert it, or asserting it one way and not the other, is not malpractice. 60 
Reasonable lawyers could well differ over whether the first amend-
versed (on other grounds) in part in Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (197,s). 
66. 381 F. Supp. at 200. Failure to argue the first amendment was an alternative 
holding. The trial court also found that the union violated the duty of fair representation 
because its lawyer, who met Holodnak for the first time shortly before the arbitration, 
adopted an inferior trial strategy by arguing that Holodnak did not fully understand 
what he was doing. (According to the company's appellate brief, the attorney, who was 
replacing a colleague who died before the hearing, had reviewed the file and was fllmil· 
iar with the case.) The lower court also indicated that the arbitrator was biased against 
the grievant. 385 F. Supp. 191, 195·200. The court of appeals expressed general agree· 
ment with the trial court's findings but did not specifically address the issue of union 
representation. 514 F.2d at 287. 
Holodnak's article criticized the union, the pennanent arbitrator (who sustained the 
discharge) and the company. 
67. Circuit Judge Lumbard, sitting by designation, 381 F. Supp. at 193. 
68. 514 F.2d at 287. 
69. "[Ilt has frequently been held that a lawyer is not liable for lack of knowledge as 
to the true state of the law where a doubtful or debatable point is involved." Annot., 45 
A.L.R.2d 5, 15 (1956). See, e.g., Martin v. Burns, 102 Ariz. 341, 343, 429 P.2d 660, 662 
(1967) (refusing to hold an attorney liable "for a mistake in a point of law that has not 
been settled by the highest court of the jurisdiction and upon which reasonable lawyers 
may differ."); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 587, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 
825; Banerian v. O'Malley, 42 Cal. App. 3d 604, 613, 116 Cal. Rptr. 919, 925 (1974); 
Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954); Collins v. Wanner, 382 P.2d 105 
(Okla. 1963). 
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ment applied to Avco Corporation.70 Before Holodnak71 no case had 
held that defense contractors were limited by the Brst amendment.72 
But the Holodnak case was brought against a union for violation of 
the duty of fair representation, and a higher standard than that set for 
attorneys prevailed. 
Griffin v. VAW73 is another case involving a union "error" which 
would not amount to malpractice. Mr. Griffin's foreman disciplined 
him for a rules infraction. Later, at a hockey game, they fought, the 
foreman sustaining facial lacerations and cracked ribs, Mr. Griffin sus­
taining a fifty dollar fine on a charge of criminal assault. The company 
70. The closest case, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) in­
volved racial discrimination by a restaurant, a lessee of the government. Not only was 
Burton distinguishable on its facts, but the Supreme Court was not o\'eri)' interested in 
expanding its holding. The Court in Burton warned that the decision rested upon the 
peculiar facts of the case. "Owing to the very 'largeness' of government a multitude of 
relationships might appear to some to fall within the Amendment's embrace, but that. it 
must be remembered, can be determined only in the framework of the peculiar facts or 
circumstances present." 365 U.S. at 725-26. Later, the Court refused to extend Burton to 
private clubs holding state liquor licenses. Moose Lodge No. 107 \'. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 
(1972). Indeed, after the Holodnak arbitration hearing, the Supreme Court refust.-d to 
apply the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to a public utility that cut off 
service, even though the utility was closely regulated by go\'ernment. Jackson v. Met­
ropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). The Second Circuit refused to extend the 
first amendment to a university research project funded by the feder.u government. 
Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974). 
Still another Supreme Court decision stated that public employees who criticize their 
employer may, under certain circumstances, be fired, despite the first amendment. Pick­
ering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). And the NLRB and the Supreme Court 
had ruled that employees who publicly attack their company's product as a bargaining 
tactic are not protected by the National Labor Relations Act and may be fired. See 
NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW ("Jefferson Standard"), 346 U.S. 464 (1953); Patterson 
v. Sargent Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1627 (1956). It is not uncommon for arbitr.ltors to sus­
tain discharges of employees who criticize the company. Sec Thiokol Chem. Corp., 52 
Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1254 (1969); Forest City Publishing Co., 58 Lab. Arb. & Disp. 
Settl. 773 (1972); Carl Fischer, Inc., 24 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 675 (1955). 
71. 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974), affd in part, rcv'd in part. 514 F.2d 285 (2d 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975). 
72. Avco's brief in the court of appeals states: "To suggest that Avco's military con­
tracts alone constitute a significant governmental presence is to say that any priwte 
corporation which sells a substantial portion of its output at a single plant to the gov­
ernment is a party coming within the ambit of the First Amendment. This standard ... 
would bring under the umbrella of the 'governmental action' the majority of major man­
ufacturing corporations in the United States." Brief for Petitioner. Holodnak \'. Avco 
Corp., 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1975). Others have argued that the Supreme Court should 
extend the Bill of Rights to control corporations. Sec A. S. MILLER. THE ~tOOER." 
CORPORATE STATE, 182-87 (1976). However. this step remains to be taken b)' the 
United States Supreme Court. 
73. 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972). 
644 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:627 
fired Mr. Griffin, no doubt to protect the foreman from further as­
saults and to deter others from attacking their foremen. Mr. Griffin's 
union prepared a grievance and filed it at the first level. The union, 
faced with the choice of filing the grievance with the man who fired 
the grievant or with the man who fought him, chose the latter. When 
the case finally went to arbitration, the discharge was sustained. Mr. 
Griffin then sued the union for violation of the duty of fair represen­
tation and won a $12,000 verdict. The court of appeals affirmed. 74 
The court nullified the arbitration decision, not because of what the 
union did at the arbitration hearing but because the court thought 
the Original grievance should have been filed with the man who fired 
Griffin-not because the contract required it, but for psychological 
reasons. The court speculated that although the foreman could not be 
expected to overturn the discharge, perhaps the foreman's superior 
might, especially because the foreman was unpopular. 75 
Had this been a case against a lawyer for malpractice, for filing 
the grievance with the foreman, the lawyer would have won. The 
courts do not second-guess a lawyer's choice of strategy and tactics. 
Choices of forum, remedies, arguments, and witnesses are within the 
attorney's discretion. 76 If the attorney makes an honest judgment, 
74. Id. at 182-84. The court drew a distinction between negligence and handling a 
grievance in a perfunctory manner. Only the latter is a violation of the duty of fair 
representation. How the two concepts differ, the court never explained. See 469 F.2d at 
183. 
75. 469 F.2d at 184-85. The court also said that had the matter been appealed to the 
manager sooner, the manager might have reversed the discharge. With all due respect, 
we believe the court engaged in pure speculation which ignores the industrial facts of 
life: companies do not like to see their foremen assaulted and tend to discharge those 
who engage in the practice. The numerous assault cases are cited in F. ELKOURI & E. 
ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 656 (3d ed. 1973). 
76. See Stricklan v. Koella, 546 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tenn. App. 1976) (choice of tactics 
will rarely, if ever, support a malpractice claim); Oda v. Highway Ins. Co., 44 III. App. 
2d 235, 252, 194 N.E.2d 489, 498 (1963) (failure to call corroboration witness is not 
malpractice); Lynn v. Lynn, 4 Wash. App. 171, 175,480 P.2d 789, 792 (1971) (a differ­
ence of opinion over trial tactics is not malpractice); Baker v. Beal, 225 N.W.2d 106, 
112-13 (Iowa 1975) (election to sue under one dram shop act and not the other is not 
malpractice; neither is the decision to ask for $35,000 damages and no more. In the 
course of the opinion, the court reviewed the authorities and concluded: "It is the gen­
erally accepted rule that mere errors of judgment by a lawyer are not grounds for neg­
ligence, at least where the lawyer acts in good faith and exercises a reasonable degree 
of care, skill and diligence." 225 N.W.2d at 112.). A review of the California decisions 
concludes: "In view of the complexity of the law and circumstances which call for dif­
ficult choices among possible courses of action, the attorney cannot be held legally re­
sponsible for an honest and reasonable mistake of law or an unfortunate selection of 
remedy or other procedural step." 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 150, at 161 
1977) FINAUTY OF ARBITRATION &15 
and loses the case, the courts will not call the decision malpractice. If 
every choice of strategy were later reviewed in a second lawsuit for 
malpractice, the trial of cases would become impossible.77 
These cases illustrate the developing double standard. one for 
unions representing members in discharge cases before arbitrators. 
another for lawyers representing clients in court. The lawyer is held 
to the lower standard.78 The reason for this difference in treatment is 
not readily apparent. It may be grounded in a judicial distrust of 
unions in discharge cases. For example, the employer in Hines v. 
AncTwr Motor Freight79 knew no more about the facts than the 
union. Both sides had the same evidence. The court of appeals80 and 
the Supreme Courts1 stated that the company acted in good faith; yet 
both courts were willing to allow a jury to conclude that the union 
did not. In fact, the court of appeals in Hines indicated that the issue 
of fair representation would be allowed to go to a jury even if the 
proof of bad faith were "minimal."82 For that proposition the court 
relied upon St. Clair v. Local 515,83 a discharge case. There, the 
union contract had no arbitration clause. The union protested Mr. St. 
Clair's discharge, but unsuccessfully. It failed to strike over the dis­
charge, or to threaten to strike, or to file a second protest. 84 Those 
facts were enough to create a jury question of whether the union 
violated the duty of fair representation. Other cases have dispensed 
(2d ed. 1970). See also Banerian v. O'Malley, 42 Cal. App. 3d 604, 613, 116 Cal. Rptr. 
919,925 (1974). 
77. The English rule is even stronger than the general rule in this country: a trial 
attorney may not be sued for the manner in which a case is tried. The immunity is 
absolute. There are no exceptions. See Randel v. W., [1966] 1 All E.R. 467, 480, and the 
same case on appeal, [1966] 3 All E.R. 657, 667 (C.A.), Randel v. Worsle)', [1967] 3 All 
E.R. 993 (H.L.). 
78. See notes 76 and 77 supra. 
79. 424 U.S. 554 (1976). 
80. 506 F.2d at 1157. 
81. 424 U.S. at 569. 
82. 506 F.2d at 1157. 
83. 422 F.2d 128, 131 (6th Cir. 1969) ("In considering the issue of good faith rep­
resentation, the jury must of course consider the union's duty to represent all of its 
members. It might conclude that the union was acting in good faith in refusing to strike 
and thereby jeopardizing many members' livelihoods over a grie\'ance which either it or 
the employer in good faith considered frivolous. Although we think that the e\'idence of 
bad faith is minimal, there is enough to present a jury question."). 
84. The court of appeals stated that the inaction of the union president, to whom the 
grievant was referred after the union's assistant business agent lodged the initial protest 
with the company, might have supported a charge of bad faith since there was a union 
election in progress in which the grievant was vocally opposing the incumbents, includ­
ing the president. 422 F.2d at 131. 
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entirely with the notion that plaintiff must prove the union acted in 
bad faith. 85 One commentator has written that the duty of fair rep­
resentation is violated by proof of union "carelessness" plus "animos­
ity" and that the courts should not require proof of "negligence."86 
Should the courts pursue their present course, and give Hines an 
expansive interpretation, they will find themselves labor arbitrators of 
last resort. Some of the same personality traits that can lead to dis­
charge may not endear the grievant to labor any more than man­
agement. 87 Couple such a grievant with an accusation that the union 
failed to investigate the discharge adequately, and you have created a 
technique to retry arbitration cases in court. 
The courts have never come to grips with labor's power to in­
voke arbitration. The present compromise-give the union the power 
to arbitrate unless the union refuses, out of spite or ill will88-has led 
85. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 1975); sec also 
Beriault v. Local 40, Super Cargoes & Checkers, 501 F.2d 258, 264 (9th Cir. 1974); 
Pompey v. General Motors Corp., 385 Mich. 537, 189 N.W.2d 243 (1971). "An allegation 
that plaintiff's attempt to remedy his grievance was thwarted by lack of response and 
interest on the part of union officials was a sufficient allegation that the union acted 
arbitrarily and with bad faith." Lowe v. Hotel Employees Local 705, 389 Mich. 123, 
146, 205 N.W.2d 167, 178 (1973), stating the holding of Pompey, supra. Perhaps the 
strongest statement found in any case minimizing or dispensing with the bad faith re­
quirement is found in Lowe: 
Every man's employment is of utmost importance to him. It occupies his time, 
his talents, and his thoughts. It controls his economic destiny. It is the means 
by which he feeds his family and provides for his security. It bears upon his 
personal well-being, ... and physical health. 
It is no solace to a man fired from his job that his union acted without spite, 
animosity, ill will, and hostility toward him. If he has been wrongfully dis­
charged by his employer, in violation of his contract of employment, a collec­
tive bargaining agreement made for his benefit and protection, it is unthinkable 
that he should be denied relief-denied justice-by the courts. 
389 Mich. 123, 148, 205 N.W.2d 167, 178-79. Other courts, including the court of ap­
peals in Hines, 506 F.2d at 1156-57, have required proof of bad faith. See, e.g., DlII v. 
Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 952 (1971) 
("proof that the union may have acted negligently or exercised poor judgment is not 
enough to support a claim of unfair representation," quoting from Bazarte v. United 
Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1970». See also Lewis v. Magna Am. Corp., 
472 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1972). 
86. Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEXAS L. 
REV. 1119, 1171 (1973). 
87. There is no requirement that unions have to like a grievant before they defend 
the person, any more than criminal lawyers need to like the accused. I have seen union 
representatives fight vigorously to save the jobs of miscreants not because they liked the 
people, but because it was their job. 
88. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
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to a new doctrine: if the union arbitrates poorly, and loses, the case 
will be retried if the grievant can show some evidence of animosity. 
This doctrine means that arbitration is less binding than court 
litigation. Consider the outcome if the discharge hearing in the Hines 
case had been tried in court. Assume the jury believed the drivers 
were lying, and sustained the discharge. And assume that one year 
later, the clerk recanted. The drivers could not have won a retrial on 
the theory that they were not represented adequately. If a lawyer 
makes an error, the remedy is a malpractice suit against the lawyer, 
but not a new trial against the original defendant.89 Arbitration, 
intended to be more binding than litigation, ends up being less 
binding. 
If a witness in a criminal trial recants, the defendant is not enti­
tled automatically to a new trial. Recantations are looked upon with 
suspicion.90 The federal rule requires the judge who presided over 
the trial to hold a hearing to hear the recantation before deciding 
whether to grant a new trial. 91 The trial judge is in a better position 
to determine whether justice requires a new trial.92 Hines did not ex­
plore the possibility of an initial hearing to determine the truth of the 
recantation, yet the outcome will turn on whether the clerk's affidavit 
was true or false. The Court did not mention the usual cautions about 
recantations; nor did it remand the case to the arbitrators for them to 
hear the recantation. Instead, it appeared willing to allow a jury to 
speculate over whether the union could have discovered that the clerk 
would recant his testimony, and to speculate over whether, by failing 
so to discover, the union violated its duty of fair representation. 
89. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962). Dismissing an action for 
failure to prosecute, the Court stated: "Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney ... , 
and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely 
selected agent." 370 U.S. at 633-34. 
"In civil cases the rule is practically universal that a new trial will not be granted on 
the ground of the negligence or incompetence of the attorney for the party applying for 
such new trial." 58 AM. JUR. 2d New Trial § 160 (1971). But see In re Cremidas' Estate, 
14 F.R.D. 15 (D. Alaska 1953) (attorney's intoxication during trial grounds for retrial). 
90. See, e.g., United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401, 403 (2d Cir. 1954). 
The fact that a witness for the prosecution has recanted does not automat· 
ically entitle the defendant to a new trial. The courts are suspicious of such a 
change in the testimony of a witness, and tlle)' are entitled to weigh the 
changed testimony carefully to determine which version of tlle story told by the 
witness is the one that should be believed. 
58 AM. JUR. 2d New Trial § 175 at 391. 
91. See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir. 1976). 
92. Id. at 866; United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 111·12 (1946). 
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The price of perfect justice93 is high, and if the courts want to 
redetermine the guilt of persons discharged for alleged wrongdoing 
and found to be in the wrong by arbitrators, then discharge arbitra­
tion will no longer be final and binding. 
IV. THE TRANSFER OF POWER FROM ARBITRATORS TO COURTS 
The fair representation doctrine transfers the power to interpret 
and apply labor contracts from the arbitrator, the person most desired 
by labor and management, to a judge and jury. As a result, both 
labor and management lose control over what their contract means, 
and lose the kind of predictability that comes with experienced labor 
arbitrators. For example, in Barrett v. Safeway Stores, Inc. ,94 the 
company refused to assign two stock room clerks to the day shift. The 
clerks complained to the union. The union told them that the con­
tract, as interpreted and applied for twenty-two years, allowed the 
company to assign them to the night shift. The two workers disagreed 
with the union's interpretation of the contract. The union refused to 
spend the money to arbitrate their case. They sued, claiming the 
company had violated the contract, won a jury verdict of over three 
thousand dollars, but lost in the court of appeals by one vote. 95 An 
experienced labor arbitrator would have taken ten minutes in decid­
ing this case for the company: both union and company agreed to the 
interpretation of the contract and the past practice was long standing, 
well-known, accepted, and clear. In such cases, the past practice will 
invariably prevail. 96 
This is not the only case in which the trial court submitted to the 
jury the question of the meaning of a labor contract, despite the exis­
tence of an arbitration clause in the agreement. 97 The majority rule is 
that questions of contract construction are for the judge.98 Whether it 
93. The phrase is from the title of the 1974 book by Judge Macklin Fleming, The 
Price of Perfect justice. 
94. 538 F.2d 1311 (8th Gir. 1976). 
95. Id. The dissenting judge would have allowed the jury to decide what the con­
tract meant, but because the jury rendered two inconsistent verdicts, he would have 
remanded for a new trial. 538 F.2d at 1315. 
96. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 406 (3d ed. 1973). 
97. Some courts have upheld the practice. See, e.g., Butler v. Local 823, Int'I Bhd. of 
Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 452 (8th Gir. 1975) (the question of the meaning of the terms 
of the contract had not been submitted to the jury because the court had found its terms 
to be unambiguous). See also Scott v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 496 F.2d 276, 280 
(6th Gir. 1974) and cases cited therein. 
98. See Barrett v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 538 F.2d 1311, 1313 (8th Gir. 1976) and cases 
cited therein. 
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is judge or jury, the procedure clearly violates federal labor policy. If 
the parties have bargained for an arbitrator's construction of the con­
tract, they are entitled to it. This has been recognized in at least one 
action, which was brought against a railway union. If the union vio­
lates the duty of fair representation, the remedy is not a court trial 
over the meaning of the contract; the remedy is an arbitration before 
the National Railroad Adjustment Board.99 It has exclusive jurisdic­
tion of the interpretation and application of railway contracts. lOO The 
Sixth Circuit has recognized the force of this argument. It was willing 
to permit a trial court to refer the underlying claim of breach of con­
tract to arbitration, assuming that the member could first prove in 
court that the union violated the duty of fair representation. lOl But 
this case is clearly the exception. 
National labor policy favors the submission of grievances to arbi­
trators, not courts. 102 Nevertheless, the practice of allowing judges 
99. See Goglowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 423 F. Supp. 901, 903lW.D. Pa. 1976). 
Cf. Kesinger v. Universal Airlines, Inc., 474 F.2d 1127, 1131-32 (6th Cir. 1973) (as 
against a district court, the Civil Aeronautics Board has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve 
grievances arising out of labor-management negotiations on seniority lists after airline 
mergers): but see Schum v. Southern Buffalo Ry. Co., 496 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974); bllt cf 
Augspurger v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 510 F.2d 853, 858 (doctrine of pri­
mary jurisdiction [of ICC] should not be invoked in a genuine fair representation ac­
tion). Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970) emphasized the difference between actions 
for breach of the duty of fair representation and claims for breach of contract. It held 
that a suit against the union for breach of duty is not subject to the ordinary rule that 
administrative remedies should be exhausted before resort to the courts. 397 U.S. at 28. 
100. Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320 (1972) held that claims of 
breach of contract fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjust­
ment Board. The case did not involve the duty of fair representation. A 1969 case, 
Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 329-31 (1969), indicated that at least in 
cases of alleged racial discrimination, the plaintiffs need not exhaust their remedies 
before the Board before seeking relief in the courts. 
101. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 312-15 (6th Cir. 1975). Scc also 
Hotel Employees v. Michelson's Food Serv., 545 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1976). The trial 
court in Ruzicka at first ordered all issues to arbitration, including the issue of fair 
representation, but then changed its mind. See 523 F.2d at 313-14. 
102. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 569 (1960) ("When 
the judiciary undertakes to determine the merits of a grievance under the guise of in­
terpreting the grievance procedure of collective bargaining agreements, it usurps a func­
tion which under that regime is entrusted to the arbitration tribuna!."). 
United Steelworkers buried the earlier decision in lAM \'. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 
App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1947), affd, 297 N.Y. 519,74 N.E.2d 464 (1947). Under 
the Cutler-Hammer doctrine, a company, after agreeing to arbitrate all grie\'ances, could 
avoid arbitration if it could convince a judge that the grie\'ance lacked merit. The Su­
preme Court rightly saw that this doctrine allowed the compan>' to substitutl' the I.:ourt's 
judgment for the arbitrator's. 363 U.S. at 568. See generally Feller,.-\ General T/leory of 
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L.R. 663, 813-17 U973). 
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and juries to interpret labor contracts has been resurrected by the 
doctrine of fair representation. Indeed, the Second Circuit has al­
lowed individual union members to avoid arbitration by merely alleg­
ing a conspiracy between labor and management. loa Not only have 
the courts interpreted labor contracts under the fair representation 
doctrine, they have actually nullified agreements by depriving employ­
ers of the benefit of perfectly valid contract clauses requiring that a 
discharge be grieved or arbitrated within a certain time period or be 
lost forever. When the union fails to file the grievance or ask for 
arbitration within the contractual time period, the employee may sue 
the union for inadequate representation and the employer for wrong­
ful discharge. In some jurisdictions, the employee has prevailed. lo4 
Thus, the time limits bargained for by the principals are nullified. 
V. SUMMARY 
1. The duty of fair representation now applies to the manner in 
which unions prepare and present arbitration cases. 
2. There is no corresponding duty for company advocates. 
3. In effect, the courts appear to be in the process of creating a 
doctrine of union malpractice. 
4. It is possible that malpractice by itself will constitute a vio­
lation of the duty of fair representation. Proof of bad faith, or ill will, 
may become unnecessary. 
5. The union "carelessness" standard is unrealistically high. Ar­
bitration cannot function under a rule requiring the union to inves­
tigate all adverse witnesses. Indeed, the emerging rule requires a 
higher standard for nonlawyer advocates in arbitration than for lawyer 
advocates in civil trials. It is unfair to hold the union advocate, who 
103. See Desrosiers v. American Cyanamid Co., 377 F.2d 865, 870 (2d Cir. 1967); 
Hiller v. Liquor Salesmen's Local 2, 338 F.2d 778, 779 (2d Cir. 1964). The Ninth Circuit 
disagrees. Hotel Employees v. Michelson's Food Serv., 545 F.2d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 
1976). 
104. See Handwerk v. Steelworkers, 67 Mich. App. 747, 242 N.W.2d 514 (1976); 
Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975); Ruggirello v. Ford 
Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Jackson v. Regional Transit Serv., 54 
App. Div. 2d 305, 388 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1976). The Fourth Circuit reached a somewhat 
different result in a railroad case, indicating that if the time limits for appeal expiro 
because of the failure of the union to press the appeal, the employee's claim against the 
employer is extinguished, but the union should be held responsible to the employee for 
the value of the right lost. Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558, 562 (4th Cir. 
1975) (dicta). Professor Feller would waive the time limits. See Feller, note 102 suprll 
at 826. 
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may not be an attorney, to the same standard as a trial attorney. It is 
worse to hold that same lay advocate to a higher standard. Yet, that is 
what occurred in Hines. 
6. The rule only allows one side to appeal to the courts. If a 
company loses an arbitration, it cannot retry the case in court, even if 
its advocate did a poor job. 
7. The rule means that arbitration decisions are less final and 
binding than court trials; if a plaintiff loses a court trial because of 
inadequate counsel, the remedy is not a second lawsuit against the 
defendant. 
8. The rule transfers the power to interpret the labor contract 
from arbitrators selected by the parties to the crowded dockets of 
state and federal courts. 
9. The rule allows an individual to escape the arbitration clause 
of an agreement. 
10. The rule gives the grievant the psychological advantage of 
coming before the jury as the victim of alleged union malpractice, 
rather than a person who was allegedly discharged for cause. lOS 
11. The rule exposes companies to liabilities against which 
there is no protection. The company cannot buy insurance against the 
union's losing an arbitration decision. 
12. The present rule, by requiring ill will, favors the trouble­
maker. A grievant who never did anything to offend the union leader­
ship cannot use it. 
The Hines decision, by permitting a jury to infer, from evidence 
of animosity, that the union's alleged carelessness was deliberate. 
could well convert the courts into labor arbitrators of last resort. 
Whether any particular arbitration is final and binding will herein­
after turn on the particular facts of the case and the predilection of the 
jury. lOS And in time, the proof of animosity may become a fiction. That 
is because the moral judgment that a union ought not to make a de­
liberate error out of spite, when converted into a rule of law. leads to 
unequal results. Two discharges, two errors, two arbitrations. and two 
lawsuits to overturn them, will produce two different results. if one 
union member can prove animosity and the other cannot. 107 By alIow­
105. Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972) (worker who assaulted foreman 
awarded twelve thousand dollar verdict). 
106. For a similar observation of Vaca v. Sipes, SCI.' Lewis, Fair Rcprt'st'lltatioll ill 
Grievance Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967 SUP. CT. RE\'. 81. 
107. See generally Feller, supra note 102. 
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ing a jury to infer that animosity caused the error, the law, in time, 
may come to regard that inference as a nctionand will drop the animos­
ity requirement. lOS That development, which is already occurring,10!) 
could seriously impair arbitration. llo Even without that development, 
Hines creates serious practical problems, best illustrated by an an­
ology to litigation. Applied to lawyers, Hines would mean this: if a law­
yer makes an error, not amounting to malpractice, and if the law­
yer had shown some animosity towards the client, the jury would be 
allowed to infer that the animosity caused the error. The lawyer would 
be liable for an error of judgment, rather than for malpractice. Such 
a result, unworkable in the rough and tumble of litigation, is equally 
unrealistic in the rough and tumble of labor relations. 111 
108. See generally Blumrosen, Individual Rights Under Collective Contracts, 15 
LAB. L.J. 598 (1964). But see notes 53 & 29 supra. 
109. See note 85 supra. For a view favoring this development, see Clark, supra noto 86. 
1l0. See Feller, supra note 102 at 812. For an opposing view favoring tho individual, 
see Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation, 8 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1096, 1119 (1974). 
lli. In time, unions, to protect against liability, may require unpopular grievants to 
hire their own counsel, so that if errors are made, the union will not be responsible. 
Discharge is said to be the industrial equivalent of capital punishment. The loss of a job 
and income can be devastating. If the law fears giving unions the power to say "no" to 
an individual who has been fired and who wants to arbitrate, or if the law wants higher 
standards of advocacy, then perhaps the law ought to allow that individual to invoke ar­
bitration, at his or her expense. This is not because the individual ought to have that 
power over all grievances, but because "death is different." (The phrase "death is dif­
ferent" is from Arguments before the Supreme Court, 44 U.S.L.W. at 3554, 3558 (Apr. 6, 
1976). This alternative would be far less costly than the Hines solution of years of litiga­
tion, and a potential recovery in seven figures. Employees of railroads or airlines have 
this right, see Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25,28 n.l (1970), but those workers who come 
under the National Labor Relations Act do not. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967). 
See generally Feller, supra note 102; Marchione, A Case of Individual Rights Uncler 
Collective Agreements, 27 LAB. L. J. 738 (1976); Rabin & Koretz, Arbitration (wel/ncll­
vidual Rights, THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA (1976); Simpson & 
Berwick, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures and the Individual Employee, 51 TEX. 
L. REV. 1179, 1227 (1973); Summers, Collective Power and Individual Rights In the Col­
lective Agreement, 72 YALE L.J. 421-55 (1963); Tobias, A Plea For the Wrongfully Dis­
charged Employee Abandoned by His Union, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 55, 59·61 (1972). 
